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THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT (Synthesis) is an initiative of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to 
produce relevant, concise, and thought-provoking briefs and reports on today’s important health 
policy issues. By synthesizing what is known, while weighing the strength of ﬁ ndings and exposing 
gaps in knowledge, Synthesis products give decision-makers reliable information and new insights to 
inform complex policy decisions. For more information about the Synthesis Project, visit the Synthesis 
Project’s Web site at www.policysynthesis.org. For additional copies of Synthesis products, please go 
to the Project’s Web site or send an e-mail request to pubsrequest@rwjf.org.
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FindingsIntroduction
Concern about high and rising health care costs in the United States has increased sharply in 
recent years (45). Indeed a popular topic of discussion in health policy circles is whether steps can 
be taken to expand insurance coverage without simultaneously taking steps to slow rising health 
care costs.
By any measure—per capita spending or share of gross domestic product (GDP), for example—U.S. 
spending on health care is greater than other developed countries. In 2006, the United States 
spent $2.1 trillion, or 16 percent of GDP, on health care, translating to $7,026 per person annually 
(9). Yet unlike other developed countries that provide near-universal coverage, the United States 
in 2006 had 47 million people, or 15.8 percent of the U.S. population, who were uninsured (25). 
The increased attention to health care costs is merited and likely reflects the recent trend of health 
insurance premiums—the most visible indicator of health care costs—growing at a much faster rate 
than workers’ earnings. According to data from the Kaiser Family Foundation-Health Research 
and Educational Trust Annual Employer Survey and the U.S. Department of Labor, premiums 
for employment-based private insurance increased 114 percent from 1999 to 2007, while earnings 
increased 27 percent, leaving a gap of 7 percentage points per year, on average (46, 86).1 
The gap between health spending trends and income trends likely has led to a sharp increase in 
the proportion of the population concerned about their ability to afford health insurance in the 
future. When health care spending grows at much faster rates than GDP or workers’ earnings, 
health insurance becomes less affordable—and more people become uninsured.2 Those who can 
continue to afford coverage are finding that premiums and payments for medical care not covered 
or paid for by insurance are becoming increasingly large over time in relation to income. As state 
and federal political leaders recognize these pressures, they have responded to voter concerns with 
proposals aimed at making insurance more affordable. At the same time, government leaders are 
recognizing that costs of existing government commitments to finance health care are already 
crowding out other public spending priorities, increasing pressure for higher tax rates and, at the 
federal level, leading to higher deficits. 
Key Concepts: Understanding Health Care Costs
Issues of health care costs have long confused many people because some terms that sound 
alike have distinct meanings or because the same term is used—imprecisely—to refer to different 
concepts. For example, the term “costs” can mean the cost of a unit of service, the price of that 
service, or the cost or price of all of the services an individual or a nation uses annually. Since 
both the number of units of services per person and cost per unit have increased over time, this 
synthesis will focus on spending, which combines unit costs and rates of use, both in the aggre-
gate and by component, such as hospital care, physician services, prescription drugs and other 
services. People also mistakenly use health care costs trends interchangeably with health insur-
ance premium trends—the two are distinct but linked. Over time, spending on health care services 
covered by insurance drives premium trends, but premium trends can diverge from spending on 
covered services because the former are also affected by other factors, especially in the short run. 
1 The amounts contributed by employees increased by 115 percent for single coverage and 112 percent for family coverage, 
roughly the same as the overall premium increase, reflecting the stability in the proportions paid by employers and employees.
2 Kronick and Gilmer (49) have estimated this relationship using aggregate time series data, concluding that almost the entire 
decline in health insurance coverage among workers from 1979 to 1995 is attributable to health spending growing more rapidly 
than income.
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Health care spending per capita has increased each year, at least since 1960, when the federal 
government began tracking U.S. health care spending through the National Health Expenditure 
Accounts (NHEA), a measure of all spending on health services. In addition to spending by 
private insurance and out-of-pocket spending, the NHEA include spending by public programs, 
such as Medicare and Medicaid, spending by the uninsured, and spending for services not covered 
by insurance, such as over-the-counter medications. Since it is the most comprehensive measure 
of spending, it will be the principal focus in this synthesis. Of greatest concern to policy-makers is 
spending on services typically covered by insurance, since those services are likely to be the most 
important to people (as evidenced by their coverage by insurance) and because so much public 
funding subsidizes them, whether directly (Medicare and Medicaid) or indirectly through tax 
subsidies to private health insurance.3
Another key conceptual distinction is between the level of spending during a period of time and 
trends in spending over time. U.S. health spending per person is very high in relation to that of 
other developed countries and also is increasing rapidly over time. The distinction is important to 
understanding what is driving spending and what can be done to address it. For example, many 
believe that the fragmentation of health care financing and delivery in the United States is a 
factor behind high spending per person, but it may not be an important factor behind the growth 
in spending over time. If fragmentation leads spending to be X percent higher than it could be, 
that X percent could be relatively constant over time. Other factors, such as medical technology, 
lead both to high spending per person—technology that has already been incorporated into care 
delivery—and spending increasing over time as new technologies are developed and diffuse. 
This synthesis addresses the following questions:
1. What are the historical data on health care spending?
2. Are health care costs too high?
3. How does U.S. spending on health care compare with other developed nations?
4. What is driving the growth in health care spending?
5. What are the short-term spending trends?
3 Employer contributions to employee health benefits are not taxable to the employee. Employee contributions made through a 
Section 125 cafeteria plan are made from pre-tax income.
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What are the historical data on health care spending?
The NHEA maintained by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Office of the 
Actuary are considered the “gold standard” for measurement of spending trends. They examine 
both sources and uses of funds for health services and some other categories, such as research. 
Between 1960 and 2006, health care spending increased by an average of 9.9 percent per year, 
while GDP increased 7.3 percent per year (11). With appropriate compounding, this amounts to a 
gap of 2.5 percentage points per year between spending growth and GDP growth, resulting in the 
share of GDP devoted to health care increasing from 5.2 percent in 1960 to 16 percent in 2006. In 
inflation-adjusted terms, the health spending trend is more than twice as large as the GDP trend. 
Figure 1, which focuses on the second half of this historical period, shows the strikingly different 
relationship between the trends in health spending and GDP in different periods.
Figure 1. Annual Growth Rate of Health Spending and GDP, 1985–2006
 
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2008 (12)
Hospital care and physician and clinical services are by far the two largest components of personal 
health spending, accounting for 31 percent and 21 percent, respectively, in 2006 (Figure 2) (9).4 
Prescription drugs account for only 10 percent of overall spending, although that is 40 percent 
higher than its share in 1970. Growth rates of the distinct components differ by time period, with 
the rank order often changing from decade to decade, but each of these three has had higher rates 
of growth than the remainder of health spending. 
4 The series most often compared to GDP is national health spending. But for analysis of components, the series on personal 
health spending (includes all of national health spending except program administration and net cost of private health insurance, 
government public health activities, and investment in research and in structures and equipment) is more appropriately used.
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Figure 2. Trends in Personal Health Care Spending, Distribution by Category, 1985–2006
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2008 (11)
CMS attempts to adjust health care spending for inflation by using a price deflator. For 
1970–2006, CMS’ implicit price deflator for personal health care has increased more rapidly than 
the implicit price deflator for the entire GDP—5.9 percent versus 4.1 percent per year, suggesting 
that increases in prices as well as in quantities of services are important factors in explaining why 
health spending trends are higher than trends in GDP (11). If productivity trends were lower in 
health care than in the rest of the economy, which could come from weaker incentives to increase 
efficiency, this could explain at least a portion of the difference. Cutler et al. (21) argues, however, 
that typical measures of health care price trends overstate them because of the lack of adjustment 
for quality, so that a portion of increasing prices reflect improvements in the product. Indeed, 
they estimate that for heart attack treatment, between 1983 and 1994, the inflation-adjusted price 
for a quality-adjusted life year declined 1 percent annually. This type of analysis, however, runs 
the risk of having focused on a treatment area in which advances in medical technology have been 
unusually successful in increasing quality. 
Out-of-pocket spending (as a percentage of national health spending) has declined over time 
from 33 percent in 1970 to 14 percent in 2001 to 12 percent in 2006, with this trend continuing 
in recent years despite the shift to increased patient cost sharing in private health insurance (9). 
Indeed, according to these data, out-of-pocket spending since 2000 has grown even more slowly 
than GDP. Some other data sources provide a different take on this. For example, Wall Street 
analysts’ surveys of insurers to estimate “benefit buy downs,” jargon for increased patient cost 
sharing, have documented that the percentage of spending for covered services paid by patients 
with employer-based coverage has been increasing since 2002.5 This development applies only 
to services covered by employer-based health insurance, so it may not be inconsistent with the 
NHEA data, which cover spending for all services, not only those covered by insurance, and by all 
persons, including those covered by public insurance. 
5 Based on the author’s reading of these reports, which tend not to be publicly available.
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Long-range spending projections
Each year, the CMS Office of the Actuary publishes a 10-year spending projection. In the 
most recent projection, from 2007 to 2017, CMS expects U.S. health care spending to almost 
double from roughly $2.2 trillion to $4.3 trillion, while the share of GDP devoted to health 
care is expected to grow from 16.3 percent to 19.3 percent. This implies health spending growth 
outpacing growth in GDP by 1.9 percentage points per year, a somewhat smaller gap than the 
historical average, although still very large (47).6 
Forecasts for longer periods start with the premise that extrapolation of current trends will produce 
implausible results, such as almost the entire GDP going to health care, so they work from the 
other direction, considering how much health spending growth society will tolerate. This leads 
forecasters to conclude that both private and public sectors need to take far more aggressive 
actions to control spending than has been the experience to date. The Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) recently published such a forecast, assuming that spending for goods and services 
other than health care does not decline in real terms from the present time (Figure 3) (15). Under 
the CBO assumptions, health spending reaches 49 percent of GDP in 2082. This implies that 
between 2018 and 2082, health spending would increase only 1 percentage point more rapidly 
than GDP on average compared to a historical trend of 2.5 percentage points.
Figure 3. Projected Spending on Health Care as a Percentage of GDP
Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2007 (15)
Note: Excess cost growth refers to the number of percentage points by which the growth of spending (per capita) is assumed to 
exceed the growth of nominal gross domestic product (per capita).
The CMS Actuary traditionally assumed that spending per person would grow at the same rate as 
GDP because a gap could not be sustained by the economy—and thus would not occur (8). In its 
2002 Medicare Trustees report, however, it changed the assumption to a 1 percentage point gap.7 
6 A lower projection of prices explains a portion of the gap projection being somewhat smaller than in the recent past, but reasons 
for this were not offered.
7 The change was made in recognition of the powerful forces behind more rapid health spending growth, especially technologi-
cal change. The reasoning of a technical review panel that advised the Actuary emphasized why 1 percentage point was more 
reasonable than zero, rather than why 1 percentage point was the best estimate (82). 
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Are health care costs too high?
Nobody asks whether spending on computers or automobiles is too high because only private 
purchasing decisions are involved. Consumers decide what they want to buy, based on their 
preferences and their budgets. If spending on computers increased sharply, most would label this 
a success story, meaning that improvements in the products were so meaningful to consumers that 
they have decided to sacrifice other goods and services to spend more on computers.
Health care does have some critical differences, however. For one thing, much of it is paid for by 
private or public health insurance. This means that patients are shielded from most of the cost 
implications of their decisions—or their doctor’s decisions—at the point of service. Health insur-
ance products have long had features, such as administrative controls, to restrain somewhat the 
effects of these incentives. In addition, consumers do not perceive themselves to have as much 
control over spending on health care because of their dependence on physicians and standards of 
care to determine diagnosis and treatment. Although service providers outside of health care also 
have incentives to convince consumers to spend more, health care professionals are likely to have 
more influence because of consumers’ limited technical knowledge and the urgency, fear and pain 
involved in many medical episodes.
Given these circumstances, some economists are unwilling to accept the current proportion of 
GDP spent on health care as optimal. It has motivated many to focus on the value of additional 
units of health spending in relation to costs as well as the burdens of increases in spending 
(meaning what must be sacrificed) on those individuals, businesses and governments that pay for 
health services. 
Issue of value
In recent years, some economists have estimated large values—in terms of increased longevity—for 
some new technologies and cautioned that cost-containment policies could diminish the rate of 
development of valuable technologies.8 They have measured additional longevity from specific 
new technologies and assigned a value to them, using the concept of quality-adjusted life years 
(QALY). Two significant issues arise with analyses of value of new technology. One is that while 
a technology may be valuable in the aggregate, it is often applied to some patients obtaining very 
large value and others gaining little value or even being made worse off. Many valuable technolo-
gies have been applied too broadly, for example the use of the drug Vioxx by many not expected 
to benefit from its unique characteristic of causing fewer gastrointestinal problems than existing 
drugs. Similarly, some have questioned the use of angioplasty for some patients for whom medical 
treatment (drugs and lifestyle changes) would be at least as effective. So evidence of the aggregate 
value of a technology does not justify all of its applications. According to Garber, Goldman and 
Jena (35): “The variability in benefits that different patients achieve from similar interventions 
is at the heart of the conflicting views of the value of medical technology.” Championing tech-
nology does not have to be inconsistent with advocating vigorous attempts to limit use to patients 
most likely to benefit. 
8 See, for example, Cutler (19) and Lichtenberg (52).
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Researchers may have a tendency to study only the most successful technologies, if only because 
they are better known. We do not know how much is spent for technologies that are less well 
known and whether they are less valuable. Indeed, Skinner, Staiger and Fisher (75), using data 
from later years, estimated a far lower value for innovations to treat heart attacks than did Cutler 
and McClellan (20).
Analysis of the extensive variation in rates of use of services across geographic areas within the 
United States is increasingly contributing to discussions of the value of additional spending on 
health care. Much of the research has focused on the Medicare program, which has uniform 
coverage throughout the country (except for private supplemental coverage and dual eligibility 
for Medicaid). A synthesis by Marsha Gold (42) describes the extensive variation in Medicare 
spending by hospital referral region, with half the variation not explained by population charac-
teristics or prices. Those residing in high-cost regions did not receive better care or have superior 
outcomes. Fisher et al. (33), included in the Gold synthesis, showed that the 60 percent higher 
utilization in higher spending regions was explained by more frequent physician visits, especially 
in the inpatient setting, more frequent tests and minor procedures, and increased use of specialists 
and hospitals. Quality of care was no better.
One striking consideration about the literature on the value of new technology is the lack of 
discussion about the implications of the results. For example, studies of the value of new tech-
nologies for heart attacks or of new drugs presumably are not addressing a policy option of 
banning those technologies. The subtext is whether steps that would make new technologies less 
profitable for their developers—for example, through guidelines leading to their being applied to 
fewer patients—would reduce the development of the valuable new technologies. Although it goes 
without saying that less profitable research and development will reduce resources going into these 
activities, it is far less certain that it would reduce the flow of high-value new technologies. The 
law of diminishing marginal returns certainly applies to research and development, so whether 
this would occur would depend on the skill of those who allocate capital to different research and 
development projects in identifying those projects with potential for the highest value.
Issue of affordability
Research on the value of new technologies strikes some as quite academic. When health care 
spending rises substantially more rapidly than GDP, insurance premiums rise more rapidly than 
earnings. In recent years, the gap between premium trends and earning trends has been particu-
larly large, so that the inability to afford health insurance now affects many in the middle class 
(Figure 4). For many, whether advances in medical technology are valuable or not has little 
relevance if their inability to afford insurance puts those technologies beyond their reach.
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Figure 4. Average Percentage Increase in Health Insurance Premiums Compared to Workers’ 
Earnings, 1988–2007
Sources: Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust (46); Bureau of Labor Statistics, Non-Seasonally 
Adjusted Data from the Current Employment Statistics Survey, 1988–2007 (April to April).
Note: Data on premium increases reflect the cost of health insurance premiums for a family of four. The average premium increase 
is weighted by covered workers. Data on premiums not available for 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998.
Many societies have values that lead to efforts to ensure universal access to some standard of 
care, even if those with the highest incomes can access additional care. In the United States, 
public policy reflects this by use of taxes to fund public insurance for the elderly and some poor, 
particularly children, and through support of the safety net hospitals and community health 
centers that serve predominantly low-income people. When costs rise more rapidly than incomes, 
financing of these activities becomes more challenging. Maintaining this policy will require subsi-
dizing coverage for those no longer able to afford it and higher outlays in relation to revenues for 
existing commitments. The result is either crowding out of other public priorities, higher taxes or, 
at the federal level, larger deficits. When health spending increases more rapidly than growth in 
incomes, it has important fiscal ramifications for government, for those who depend on govern-
ment programs and for those who pay taxes.
Another complicating perspective is that in most advanced countries most people use the same 
medical care delivery system, implying generally the same standard of care for those who access 
the system. This leads, theoretically at least, to conflict over the level of spending incurred 
between those with different means. A market resolution to this issue would involve a splintering 
of the delivery system into subsystems that deliver different standards of care. This is probably 
happening in the United States to a much larger degree than in other advanced countries, 
where health insurance tends to be comprehensive for all people. Unconstrained growth in 
health spending in the United States will inevitably lead to fragmentation in the delivery system 
according to the ability to pay, something that at least some leaders would see as a negative.
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A distinct issue in affordability of health care is tied to the financing of coverage by employers. 
Many leaders of industry maintain that rising health insurance premiums hurt the competitive-
ness of American companies. They claim that it drives total compensation costs higher and 
reduces profitability in industries facing international competition, where prices cannot be raised 
(51). Most economists have been skeptical of this argument, since economic theory predicts that 
employers would shift rising costs of employee health benefits to employees through lowering 
other components of compensation, such as cash wages (68).
Some economists perceive that the opinion of business leaders has some merit due to institutional 
constraints. Nichols and Axeen (61) demonstrate how during periods when the gap between 
premium trends and earning trends is very large, it would take a decline in nominal wage rates to 
fully shift increasing costs of health insurance to workers. Although wage cuts are theoretically 
possible, experience shows great resistance to them. 
Source of job creation?
Those who attend meetings of local business leaders are very likely to have heard the argument 
that health care is an economic engine for the community, creating well-paying jobs for local 
residents. In certain areas, such as those that attract patients from all over the nation or the world 
for tertiary care or are centers of biomedical research and development, this is likely to be the case. 
The argument may also apply to a chronically depressed locality, where the benefit of additional 
Medicare and Medicaid spending is likely to offset the negative effect on the local economy of 
higher insurance premiums. 
At the level of the entire nation, in times other than recessions, however, the story is different. If 
people spend more money on health care, they have less to spend on other goods and services. 
So jobs gained in health care are likely to come at the expense of jobs elsewhere in the economy. 
Pauly (65) argues that the impact of shifting resources from health care to other goods and services 
depends on the value of health care, which could be lower at the margin as a result of the exten-
sive use of health insurance. Monaco and Phelps (57) model changes in health care spending 
and its effect on the role of government in the economy. If higher spending for Medicare and 
Medicaid leads to higher taxes, the loss of efficiency from higher tax rates will mean that higher 
spending detracts from the economy. Indeed, to the degree that rising health care spending hurts 
the competitiveness of American companies that compete internationally, rising spending on 
health care could be an even larger negative factor for the U.S. economy.
How does U.S. health care spending compare with that of other developed nations?
The question of whether U.S. health care costs are too high is the motivation for most analyses of 
international differences in spending. Many analyses have shown that per capita costs in the United 
States are much higher than those in other developed countries. These differences remain after 
adjustment for national incomes—and this is without taking into account that most other devel-
oped countries have universal coverage. The implication is that other systems are more efficient in 
providing health care to their populations and that U.S. spending is higher than it should be. 
Drawing on data on spending created by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) (63), numerous analyses have shown that health care spending in the United 
States is much higher than in the rest of OECD countries. For example, in 2006, U.S. spending 
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was 15.3 percent of GDP, compared to an average of 8.9 percent of GDP for all OECD countries.9 
Many researchers have concluded that despite the difference in spending, growth trends have been 
similar (40). A recent study suggests, however, that the U.S. trend has been higher than the OECD 
trend since the mid-1980s (89). Decomposing the spending trend for 1970–2002 into popula-
tion aging, economic growth and a residual called “excess growth,” and using data on aggregate 
OECD spending rather than the median OECD country, the study finds that excess growth was 
similar for 1970–1985 (U.S. 2.0 percent, OECD 1.7 percent), but fell to 0.6 percent for OECD for 
1985–2002 while the U.S. continued at 2.0 percent.
An extensive literature has examined a number of possible explanations for the differences; a 
recent comprehensive study by McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) (5) extended the number of 
explanations. The literature suggests that prices, efficiency and insurance administration are the 
most important differences. MGI estimates that drug prices are 70 percent higher in the United 
States compared with OECD countries. Physician compensation in the United States is 6.6 times 
per capita GDP for specialists and 4.2 times for primary care physicians, compared to ratios of 
4 and 3.2 in the comparison OECD countries. Salaries of nurses are in line with OECD coun-
tries. The United States spends 54 percent more than OECD countries for the top-five inpatient 
medical devices (e.g., implants, stents). Anderson and others (4, 2, 3) explain that single-payer 
systems effectively exercise monopsony power in setting payment rates for providers, which frag-
mented U.S. payers cannot muster.
The MGI study also compares efficiency across OECD countries. U.S. costs in outpatient settings 
are higher because of subscale operation of facilities. With prices very high, outpatient facilities 
in the United States can earn a profit despite underutilizing capacity. In contrast to hospital CT 
equipment being used for 20–30 scans per day, freestanding outpatient facilities, which have lower 
overhead, can earn a profit at 4–8 scans per day. This leads to extensive investments in ineffi-
ciently used capacity—and a likelihood of higher service use in response to physician self-referral 
incentives. 
Advocates of single-payer systems have long pointed to higher insurance administrative costs 
(marketing and sales, underwriting, claims processing, utilization review and profits) in the 
United States, often comparing them to Canada (90). This and earlier work by Woolhandler and 
Himmelstein (91) attracted a great deal of criticism, dwelling on the likelihood the differences 
are overstated and pointing out that U.S. political history and institutions would require even a 
feasibly reformed U.S. health care system to spend more on administration than Canada’s system 
(1, 24, 74). MGI estimated that the United States spends six times more for administration than 
OECD countries, not including the costs borne by providers in interacting with payers. 
What is driving the growth in health care spending?
An extensive literature examines which factors play the largest roles in explaining increases in health 
spending over time. Conclusions about which drivers are most important have been very consistent 
from study to study. For example, authors agree that technological change is the most important 
driver of spending increases over time and that population aging plays only a minor role (Table 1). 
9 Calculations by the author. Note that while the OECD data for the United States is based on NHEA data, adjustments are made 
to be comparable to data on other nations.
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Table 1. Estimated Contributions of Selected Factors to Growth in Real Health Care Spending 
Per Capita, 1940–1990 
Drivers of Cost Trend
Studies Estimating Contributions of Selected Drivers
Smith, Hefﬂ er and 
Freeland (2000)
Cutler 
(1995)
Newhouse 
(1992)
Aging of the Population 2% 2% 2%a
Changes in Third-Party Payment 10 13 10b
Personal Income Growth 11–18 5 <23
Prices in the Health Care Sector 11–22 19 *
Administrative Costs 3–10 13 *
Defensive Medicine and Supplier-Induced Demand 0 * 0
Technology-Related Changes in Medical Practice 38–62 49 >65
Notes: Amounts in the table represent the estimated percentage share of long-term growth that each factor accounts for.
* = not estimated.
a Represents data for 1950–1987
b Represents data for 1950–1980.
Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2008 (17) based on Smith (79), Cutler (19) and Newhouse (59)
Technology. Measuring the contribution of changing medical technology is particularly chal-
lenging because of the inability to measure aggregate technological change directly. Nevertheless, 
all of the studies reviewed obtain broadly similar results. Most studies measure technology as 
a residual; that is, after estimating the contributions of all of the directly measurable drivers of 
spending, attributing the proportion of spending increases not otherwise explained as the contri-
bution of technology. These approaches are vulnerable to confounding technological change 
with other factors for which the contribution is not fully captured (or measurement errors). For 
example, the role of increasing rates of obesity has not been studied until recently, so some of its 
impact on spending may have inadvertently been attributed to technology. In addition, separating 
the effects of technology from health insurance coverage is problematic because the contribution 
of technology would not be as great had the technologies not been covered by insurance.
A frequently cited study by Newhouse (59) attributes the bulk of the more than half of spending 
increases that could not be explained by other factors to technological change. Peden and Freeland 
(67) attribute about two-thirds of spending increases from 1960 to 1993 to technological change. 
Smith, Heffler and Freeland (79) and Cutler (19) also attribute substantial portions of spending 
increases to technological change. A technical review panel convened to advise CMS on future 
health care cost trends concluded that about half of real health expenditure growth is attributable 
to technology (82).
A few studies, instead of estimating a residual, use proxies for technological change. Okunade 
and Murthy (62) use health care research and development spending as a proxy for technological 
change. Analyzing time series data from 1960 to 1997, they do not suggest a particular percentage 
but support Newhouse’s conclusion that “technological change is a major escalator of health care 
expenditure.” Di Matteo (27) uses a time trend to proxy technological change and estimates that 
it accounts for 62 percent of the increase in spending. With such similar research results across 
studies, little is to be gained at this point by debating the contrasting methodologies. 
Cutler and McClellan (20) outline lucidly how technology advances affect aggregate spending 
trends through either treatment substitution or expansion. Treatment substitution can, in different 
cases, either increase or decrease spending. Examples of advances that increased spending per 
patient through treatment substitution are new treatments for heart attacks and breast cancer. 
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Examples where lower-cost treatments were substituted include cataract surgery, where advances 
in technology made the surgery a simple outpatient procedure, and treatment for depression with 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI), where psychotherapy was reduced or eliminated. 
Treatment expansion occurs when treatment becomes more attractive to patients because of either 
better outcomes or reduced pain or disability connected with treatment. Treatment expansion 
almost always increases spending (some preventive services would be exceptions, although most 
effective preventive services increase spending (70)). Treatment substitutions that decrease costs 
often stimulate large treatment expansions, since lower unit costs often go along with reductions 
in pain and disability, as with cataract surgery and minimally invasive gall bladder surgery.
The contribution of technological change to spending probably varies by time period. For 
example, drug spending trends, which are highly influenced by technological change, have been 
low in recent years—after being particularly high during the 1990s—due to a combination of 
relatively few approvals of “blockbuster” drugs and older drugs coming off patent. The genomic 
revolution could lead to sharply higher drug spending down the road, with recent rapid growth of 
spending on biologics an early indication of that trend.
Demographics. The literature on the role population aging plays in spending trends is extensive 
and highly consistent. Most of the studies use survey data on spending per capita at different ages 
and combine that with data on demographic trends. All of the studies reviewed project contribu-
tions of aging to spending trends of less than 0.7 percentage point per year, with the more sophis-
ticated studies tending to get the lower numbers. 
Differences in results across studies often reflect differences in the period studied. Studies exam-
ining the period before baby boomers began reaching their mid-50s obtain smaller impacts 
than those focusing on the very recent past or making projections. Strunk and Ginsburg (80) 
focused on commercial insurance premiums and estimated the contribution of population aging 
to spending growth at an average 0.1 percentage point per year in the early 1990s, rising to 0.7 
percentage point in 2001 and continuing at that rate throughout the current decade. Martini et al. 
(54), using a health plan’s administrative data, estimated that population aging will contribute 0.3 
percentage point per year from 2000–2050.
Studies that incorporate high spending in the last year of life and project a continuation of increasing 
life expectancy get even lower estimates of the impact of aging. For example, Seshamani and Gray 
(72) find that their estimate of increasing spending due to aging in England was halved to about 0.4 
percentage point per year for 2002–2026 by incorporating the end-of-life dimension. Cutler and 
Sheiner (22), who focus on Medicare spending, find that between 1990 and 2030, the percentage of 
Medicare beneficiaries in their last year of life will decline from 5 percent to 4.2 percent. The impact 
of increasing longevity swamps the 0.14 percentage point per year estimate for the role of aging in 
Medicare spending trends for 1992–2050 that they estimate assuming constant life expectancy.10 
Some studies have focused on differences in trends in health care spending by age group, raising 
concerns that spending per capita is increasing more rapidly for older people (73). More recent 
research casts doubt on those findings, however (55). 
With the literature generally consistent in showing the effect of aging on spending is small, it is 
important to examine the enormous gulf between the beliefs of health care providers and the 
research. Commonly, hospital leaders justify expansions based on “aging baby boomers.” This 
10 These analyses of the role of aging to Medicare costs do not include the large portion of long-term care not covered by Medicare.
High and rising health care costs: Demystifying U.S. health care spending | THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION | RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT NO. 16 | 13 
Findings
prompted research focused on the role of aging in the demand for inpatient hospital services (81), 
which obtained results similar to earlier studies of only a small effect.
Health Status. Using data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey and the 2001 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, a well-known analysis by Thorpe et al. (83) attributes 27 
percent of increased inflation-adjusted spending from 1987 to 2001 to increasing rates of obesity 
and changing patterns of obesity treatment and associated conditions. Increasing incidence of 
obesity contributes only 12 percentage points of the 27 percent; the remaining increase results 
from changing treatment patterns, which would more appropriately be classified as a contribution 
of technology (17).11
Analyses that do not factor in life expectancy changes from trends in health status will tend to 
overstate the contribution of health status to spending trends. Van Baal et al. (87) highlighted how 
effective steps to reduce obesity would reduce spending in the short run but increase spending in 
the long run because of increased longevity and the resulting exposure to other illnesses. Simu-
lating a cohort of 20-year-olds, those who are obese had the highest costs up to age 56. At older 
ages, smokers had the highest costs. But over a lifetime, neither obese people nor smokers were the 
most expensive. Possible implications of these results are that reductions in spending from declines 
in rates of smoking are mostly behind us, while the higher spending from increased longevity will 
predominate in the future, and reversing the trend toward obesity would lead to reduced spending 
for a long period until the effects of greater longevity eventually dominate.
Health Insurance. Most actuaries and budget analysts draw on the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment to develop assumptions about the impact of changes in insurance benefit structure 
on medical care spending by a small group of enrollees (60). CBO (17) asserts that under such 
a standard model, increased insurance coverage explains 10 percent to 13 percent of the long-
term spending trend. However, the proportion of the population with health insurance has been 
slowly declining over time, so this factor will affect future spending only if policies are enacted 
to increase the proportion of the population covered by health insurance. Indeed, it is likely that 
changes in insurance coverage during this decade have slowed the rate of health spending growth 
rather than been a driver.
The question of the role that insurance plays in cost trends at the market level—rather than indi-
vidual level—is much more complex. Newhouse outlined different possible mechanisms through 
which the amount of insurance could affect health care spending (58). The traditional mechanism—
the level of insurance coverage (or proportion of spending paid by insurance) influences the level 
of spending—does not address market dynamics in which the extent of insurance coverage influ-
ences the degree of development and introduction of new technology and affects prices charged 
by providers and the expensiveness of their approaches to treatment. Peden and Freeland (67) 
followed the Newhouse framework in explaining increases in spending by including both the 
average coinsurance rate and its percentage change in their model for changes in spending. 
The percentage change in coinsurance turns out to be the more important insurance variable, 
explaining 44.4 percent of spending increases.
To investigate the implications of large changes in health insurance on spending, Finkelstein (31) 
analyzed the impact of the implementation of the Medicare program on national health spending 
11 If the relative spending for obese and normal-weight people from 1987 had been used, the impact of increasing obesity would 
explain 4 percent of increased spending. Using the 2001 relative spending rates would explain 12 percent. Standard index number 
procedures would calculate a geometric mean between the results based on 1987 weights and 2001 weights, which is 8 percent. 
But the 2001 weights are most relevant for forecasting the role of obesity in the future—and obesity prevalence continues to 
increase (10). 
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and estimated that the creation of Medicare led to a 37 percent increase in inflation-adjusted 
hospital spending (by all patients)—six times the increase that would be expected on the basis of 
the results of the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. This was an example of changes in insur-
ance coverage for a large segment of the population—the elderly—fundamentally affecting the char-
acter of medical care for all. She estimated that changes in insurance coverage may be responsible 
for half of the increase in spending from 1950–1990, an estimate that is consistent with that of 
Peden and Freeland. 
Finkelstein suggests two models for how insurance coverage affects spending. A “fixed-costs” model 
has aggregate changes in health insurance sufficiently changing market demand to get hospitals to 
incur the fixed costs of entering a market or adopting new practice styles. A “spillovers” model has 
changes in insurance for one group of patients influencing treatment of other patients. 
A summary of the evidence on the role of health insurance coverage in health spending shows 
two strands of thought. Standard assumptions about how a change in health insurance affects an 
individual’s spending on health care lead to a conclusion that health insurance is not a domi-
nant driver of spending trends. But the literature also suggests that a change in health insurance 
affecting large numbers of people is likely to influence the care delivered to all people and influ-
ence technological change and even provider productivity. 
In the future, a decline in the comprehensiveness of insurance coverage may lead to a reversal of the 
phenomenon Finkelstein described following the introduction of Medicare. The combination of 
benefit “buy downs” (increased deductibles, coinsurance and copayments), changes in benefit struc-
tures to encourage patients to choose low-cost providers, and increased information on provider 
prices and quality could change the market dynamic to one in which consumers become more 
judicious in incurring health costs. This is more likely to affect outpatient services than inpatient 
services because current benefit structures, including high-deductible plans, have not changed incen-
tives for inpatient care substantially. If the trend toward greater financial incentives for patients is 
large enough, it may affect spending to a greater degree than standard assumptions would predict. 
Income. Newhouse (59) synthesized the literature on the role of income in health spending. Esti-
mates based on cross-sectional analysis of data on individuals tend to underestimate the magnitude 
of the relationship because poor health, which leads to high spending on health care, depresses 
income. Elasticities (the relationship between changes in income and changes in spending) from 
these studies tend to be in the 0.2–0.4 range. Studies using aggregate data, such as cross sections of 
countries, tend to obtain elasticity estimates of 1.0 or higher, suggesting that as income rises, the 
proportion of income spent on health care is likely to stay the same or increase. However, CBO 
(17) argues that the difficulties in undertaking cross-national comparisons may bias these estimates 
upward. It concludes that the literature discussed above implies contributions of income trends to 
health spending trends anywhere between 5 percent and 20 percent of long-term spending growth. 
The most recent econometric literature, using more sophisticated methods, consistently obtains 
elasticities below 1.0, implying that health care is a necessity rather than a luxury (84, 26, 34). An 
implication is that gains in income tend to ease the burdens of financing health care.
Physician Specialty Mix and Supplier-Induced Demand. A number of cross-sectional 
studies show that regions in which a higher proportion of physicians are specialists have higher 
spending, presumably because specialists practice a more expensive style of medicine—at least 
where they are in ample supply. Since the proportion of specialists in the overall physician 
workforce is increasing, this could be a driver of spending trends. Baicker and Chandra (7) use the 
Dartmouth Atlas to examine state-level Medicare claims data. They find that states with a higher 
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proportion of specialists had higher spending and lower quality. Shifting one physician per 10,000 
population from generalist to specialist increases spending per beneficiary per year by $526. 
Greenfield et al. (43) analyzed 20,000 patients who visited physician offices during a nine-day 
period in 1986 (Medical Outcomes Study) using self-administered questionnaires completed by 
both patients and physicians. A multivariate analysis with detailed patient information showed that 
patients seeing internal medicine subspecialists had higher rates of hospitalization, higher rates of 
prescriptions and higher rates of tests than those seeing general internists or family physicians. 
Since the 1970s, economists have battled over whether variations in the supply of health care 
resources, such as hospital facilities and physicians, impact the use health services. The challenge 
is to separate out variation in supply from factors other than variation in patient demand—in other 
words, getting the causation right (50, 64). Dranove (29) criticized the econometric techniques 
used to attempt to establish causation by using them to analyze the impact of physician supply on 
childbirth and finding a significant but unlikely impact. The most recent published work is from 
Australia. Using newer theoretical models and econometric techniques, Peacock and Richardson 
(66) found a substantial impact of the supply of health care resources on the use of health services. 
Although supplier-induced demand tends not to appear on lists of drivers of spending trends 
because of the controversy about its existence or magnitude, even without inducement, increases in 
supply will likely lead to higher spending; policies to constrain supply, if effective, are likely to lead 
to constrained spending. However, in health systems in which prices are not controlled centrally, 
such as the United States, constraining supply is also likely to lead to higher prices for services. 
Productivity Trends. The health care industry has many characteristics that would lead one 
to expect relatively small increases in productivity over time. For example, there tends to be 
little competition among providers on the basis of price. Extensive third-party coverage dilutes 
consumer incentives to be price conscious, and benefit structures tend to offer little reward for 
choosing a low-priced provider. On the other hand, Medicare administered pricing likely increases 
incentives to be efficient in producing individual services or, in the case of hospitals, admissions.
In a study for the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Lichtenberg (52) outlines a number 
of additional factors leading one to expect relatively low productivity growth in hospitals. These 
include high labor intensity, low investment in computers and software, and low investment 
in research and development, although one should raise the question of whether the latter two 
factors result from lack of incentives to increase productivity. He notes that government statistics 
on constant dollar output and American Hospital Association data on full-time equivalent staff 
suggest productivity growth at less than half the rate of the general economy.
Cutler and McClellan (20) note that from 1960 to 1999, the medical component of the Consumer 
Price Index exceeded the overall index by about 1.8 percentage points a year, suggesting either 
increasing market power on the part of medical providers or much lower rates of productivity 
increases. They suggest that the gap is due to lack of adjustment for quality increases, arguing 
that a quality-adjusted index for treatments for the conditions examined in the study would show 
productivity gains exceeding those for the economy as a whole. 
Reflecting on these perspectives, one can conclude that most of the delivery mechanisms within 
health care are set up to have lower productivity increases than the general economy, but the 
health system also has a vibrant research and development component that over time creates 
more valuable treatments, many of which have higher quality or lower unit costs. The health care 
system, in turn, likely delivers these new technologies relatively inefficiently, both by using high 
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levels of inputs per service and by using the technologies not only for patients who derive large 
benefits from them but also for those where the benefits are small or even negative. 
Managed Care. Contributions of managed care to overall spending trends are covered in this 
synthesis mostly for historical reasons. The managed care of the 1980s and early 1990s, which was 
studied extensively, has long ago passed from the scene in response to an extensive backlash. In 
addition, because of data limitations, most of the literature defined managed care as health main-
tenance organizations (HMOs), entities that play a much smaller role in health care financing 
today. Instead of focusing on research on whether managed care reduced the level of spending, it 
is more useful to focus on whether managed care reduced the rate of spending growth. To put it 
differently, if a large stable part of the population had been served by HMOs, which clearly did 
have lower costs, would the rate of increase in spending be different? 
Two excellent syntheses help to efficiently summarize this literature (41, 14). Glied raises a 
methodological concern with selection in the enrollment process. If managed care plans experi-
ence favorable selection, their growth will lead to higher cost trends for other plans and too high 
a measured difference in trends. More recent studies show a larger cost growth difference—about 
one percentage point per year—than studies using data from the early 1980s. 
Glied notes that Cutler and Sheiner (23) is the only study to address the impact of managed care 
on technology diffusion. That study showed that states with high managed care penetration went 
from being first adopters to average adopters of new technology, suggesting potential—for better or 
for worse—of managed care slowing development or diffusion of new technology. 
A synthesis by Chernew et al. (14) contrasted studies of health plans with studies of markets. The 
former did not show differences in cost growth but the latter did. He raised the prospect that 
other health plans benefited from spillovers from managed care, resulting in market comparisons 
looking more favorable to managed care’s ability to slow cost growth than plan comparisons. 
Spillovers can occur from doctors treating all of their patients the same way, higher penetration 
by HMOs benefiting preferred provider organizations (PPOs) in provider negotiations, and the 
possibility that managed care plans cause a change in the health care infrastructure. 
Studies covering the late 1980s and first half of the 1990s may have been picking up a growing 
impact of managed care through that period as increasing plan market share increased negotiating 
clout with providers and, as Chernew et al. noted, affecting the whole infrastructure of delivery. 
This is not the same as managed care having the potential to affect the rate of growth of spending 
long term, however.
Changing Market Structure and Entrepreneurship. Markets for hospital care and for 
health insurance are becoming more concentrated over time. During the 1990s, many hospitals 
merged into systems, increasing their clout in local markets. A synthesis of the research on this 
question concluded that hospital concentration leads to higher prices (88). But considering the 
magnitude of the price increases measured, it is unlikely that the contribution of increasing 
concentration of hospitals is a major contributor to growth in health spending over time.
Health insurance also has become more consolidated over time. Mergers in the 1990s often 
increased concentration in markets. More recent mergers have not had that effect, perhaps 
due to antitrust restrictions. In recent years, however, mergers have involved national health 
plans acquiring regional plans in areas where they had only limited penetration. Because large 
employers increasingly want to contract with a single carrier, this has increased the advan-
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tage of being a large national plan.12 This has led to a difficult business environment for local 
or regional health plans, increasing the shares of the dominant plans in local markets and 
increasing entry barriers.
Whether insurer concentration contributes to trends in overall spending is a difficult question. 
Increasing power in the provider market could lead to lower payment rates, but increasing power 
in the insurance market could preclude passing the savings on to purchasers, or even lead to 
higher premiums. Like hospital concentration, however, it is unlikely that insurer concentration 
is a major driver of cost trends.
Medical Malpractice Liability. Sloan and Chepke (76) estimate that over a 30-year period 
(1970–2000), medical malpractice premiums increased from 5.5 percent to 7.5 percent of total 
physician practice expenses, so premiums cannot be an important cost driver. Research on whether 
defensive medicine affects spending is challenging because liability risk pushes physicians in the 
same direction as fee-for-service payment incentives—providing more services. The best research 
has focused on comparisons of states with tort reforms with other states. As a result, its potential 
contribution is more to the question of why health spending is high than on why it is rising.
Kessler and McClellan (48) analyzed Medicare data for beneficiaries with serious heart disease 
and found that reforms that directly reduce liability pressure (such as limits on noneconomic 
damages) lead to reductions of 5 percent to 9 percent in medical expenditures. They conclude 
that liability reform can reduce defensive medicine.
Studies of obstetrics find smaller impacts (78, 30). Only the latter study, which focused on 
cesarean delivery rates, found evidence of defensive medicine, concluding that a total cap on 
damages would reduce cesarean deliveries by 3 percent and total obstetrical charges by 0.27 
percent. A 2006 synthesis of this literature concluded that caps on noneconomic damages do 
reduce award size substantially, but the reductions in medical malpractice premiums are modest 
(56). Other tort reforms did not have significant impacts. A 2006 report by the Congressional 
Budget Office finds the evidence of impact of tort reforms to be inconsistent and dependent on 
particular relationships and specifications tested (16). 
These results confirm that the shortcomings of the liability system are not an important driver 
of cost trends or even a large factor behind costs being high. Indeed, the literature emphasizes 
that the larger potential for true reform is in the area of better quality of care and more equitable 
compensation of those suffering large losses (77)
What are the short-term spending trends?
Understanding the drivers of variation in the rate of spending growth over short periods of time 
is important, if only to reduce the risks of incorrectly concluding that changes in short-term 
spending or premium trends reflect changes in long-term spending trends. 
Business Cycle. Forecasts of health spending rely on research indicating that a key driver is 
changes in the level of economic activity that occurred a few years earlier. For example, the CMS 
Office of the Actuary, which makes 10-year spending projections, uses a five-year moving average 
of income—the forecast year and the four previous years—to predict changes in spending (47). 
12 Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, which are regional, have achieved this advantage through their coordination, giving employers 
access to Blue networks all over the country. 
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Getzen, who has contributed to this work over many years, also uses five years of income data in 
his forecasts of health spending trends for the subsequent five-year period (36). 
Until recently, forecasters did not offer a theory behind this relationship. A recent discussion 
suggests that when income trends increase or decrease, private insurance will not change right 
away because of annual contracts, the lag between employers negotiating new insurance contracts 
and their taking effect, and the time involved in employers recognizing changes in income trends 
and devising new structures in their health benefits plan (13). For the public sector, there will be 
a lag between changes in revenues and policy changes either in public insurance programs or in 
broader regulation of the health care system.
Rise and Decline of Managed Care. The Center for Studying Health System Change (HSC) 
began its Community Tracking Study site visits in 1996, close to the peak of managed care. HSC 
has observed the extensive change in the delivery system to adjust to managed care, such as 
physician-hospital organizations and hospital acquisition of primary care practices, as well as the 
backlash against managed care and the subsequent abandonment of some of the tools used to 
control costs (37). Dranove et al. (28) tracked the last development quantitatively, concluding that 
insurer market power peaked in 2001. Looking at cost trends since the early 1990s, there is little 
doubt that the rapid growth of managed care at the time and the subsequent changes in managed 
care have had important effects on cost trends. The unusually low rates of increases from the 
early 1990s through the end of that decade and the high rates of increase at the beginning of the 
current decade were likely influenced by developments in managed care (Figure 2).
Health Insurance Underwriting Cycle. A well-documented phenomenon has been how 
health insurance premiums increase at faster or slower rates than the underlying spending trend 
for services covered by insurance. This underwriting cycle has tended to be six years long, with 
three years of premiums rising more rapidly than underlying spending followed by three years of 
premiums rising more slowly than spending (44). One factor behind the cycle is the lag between 
unexpected changes in the cost trend and their reflection in premium trends. Another factor 
is that when insurance is more profitable than average, health plans are more likely to aggres-
sively seek to increase their market share in both existing and new markets, which then decreases 
the profitability in the industry, which leads to withdrawal from less profitable markets and less 
aggressive pricing.
Most observers believe that the amplitude of the underwriting cycle has moderated in recent 
years and will continue to do so. Electronic submission of claims and application of additional 
actuarial resources have reduced the time required for insurers to recognize changes in spending 
trends. Diversification of contract renewal dates has also allowed insurers to act more quickly 
when they perceive changes in spending trends (69). Grossman and Ginsburg (44) have described 
how local health insurance markets have become more difficult to enter because of factors such as 
larger local market share leading to more favorable discounts from providers and large employers 
increasingly contracting with a single insurer with strong provider networks in markets where 
employees reside. This has led to fewer efforts by insurers to enter new markets when coverage 
is particularly profitable, thus removing a key force behind the cycle. In mid 2008, Wall Street 
analysts believed that a long period of high profitability ended in 2007, but do not expect the 
cyclical decline in profitability to be large.
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Conclusion
Costs are both high and rising rapidly. Key evidence on costs being high comes from analysis on 
variations in spending per person, both internationally (the United States has much higher costs 
than other advanced countries) and geographically within the United States. In addition, there is 
no evidence that better outcomes are associated with higher spending.
The dominant driver of long-term cost trends is advancing medical technology, where new options 
for diagnosis and treatment often replace older technologies that are less expensive or provide 
opportunities when none existed before. Advancing technology may have a particularly large 
impact on spending in the United States because of few requirements that effectiveness be demon-
strated before technologies are used broadly and concern that their application tends to go beyond 
those patients likely to benefit the most from them. Other key factors are increasing rates of 
obesity and the likelihood that the delivery system is not generating increases in efficiency in line 
with the potential for such gains.
Long-range spending projections demonstrate that a continuation of existing trends will eventu-
ally lead to a situation in which spending on health care rises so rapidly that consumption of other 
goods and services will decline. This forecast makes grappling with rising spending essential.
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Policy-makers have good reason to take steps to slow the rate of increase in health care costs. The 
substantial gap between trends in spending for health care and trends in income is eroding the 
private financing of health care, making coverage unaffordable to more people each year. It is also 
placing a great deal of stress on local, state and federal budgets, where revenue growth tends to be 
in proportion to growth in income. The erosion of private financing is placing additional pressure 
on governments, which are being called on to expand their programs. These financing challenges 
are leading to a harder look at the value of health care. Although much of medical care is highly 
valuable in terms of better outcomes, there is increasing evidence of care that has low value or is 
even harmful to patients. 
Addressing medical technology
Advancing medical technology has been the most important driver of the spending trend. The 
policy challenge is to reduce growth of spending for marginal—or low-value—applications of tech-
nologies, while leaving opportunities for high-value technologies to be developed and employed 
in practice. Indeed, it is not the technologies themselves that should be labeled high or low value 
but the combination of a technology and what it accomplishes for different groups of patients. 
Three major policy options have the potential to address advancing technology in this way. 
One is for the federal government to sharply increase its funding for research on effectiveness. 
This is the beginning of an approach that supports the differentiation between technologies and 
patient applications that have high or low value. Two aspects of such a policy are needed for 
this to be effective. First, a governance structure needs to be established to provide insulation of 
this activity from narrow political pressures. The entity that manages the research effort needs to 
feel confident that research results that are unfavorable to technologies developed by a powerful 
stakeholder will not jeopardize its future funding. Second, the research needs to focus not only on 
effectiveness but also on costs of care associated with a technology. The opportunities to reduce 
growth in spending on the basis of technologies that are found to harm patients are unlikely to 
be large enough to meaningfully address the problem of rising spending. The research will need 
to differentiate between those technologies that require $10,000 to produce a quality-adjusted life 
year (QALY) and those that require $1,000,000. 
A second policy option to address advances in technology is provider payment reform. Distor-
tions in the structure of relative payments for hospitals and physicians from their intended 
paralleling of the relative costs of providing different services give an inadvertent incentive for 
providers of services to favor those services that are most profitable. Those services that have 
become relatively profitable as a result of these distortions in payment structure tend to incorpo-
rate new technologies (39).
The third policy option involves consumer incentives and support. To the degree that consumers 
bear some of the financial risk of medical spending, they are likely to be more judicious 
concerning the use of technologies that are likely to have low value to them as patients. Those 
with private insurance have begun to face increasing amounts of patient cost sharing. The federal 
government can promote increased use of consumer financial incentives by changing the tax 
treatment of health insurance. When health insurance premiums are paid mostly or entirely 
from pre-tax income, the incentive is to choose a benefit structure with little patient cost sharing 
or other restrictions on care. In recent years, this option has been seen as part of a strategy of 
consumerism in health care, which is broader than patient financial incentives. It also involves 
supporting patients with information on treatment alternatives and their effectiveness, on the 
Impl cations for Policy-Makers
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quality of different providers of care, and on the prices of each. Incentives to choose lower-priced 
providers have the potential to influence a much higher percentage of spending, but will be more 
effective under a reformed provider payment system, where prices are for broader units of service, 
such as an episode of care. Value-based benefit design can support consumer choice by varying 
the degree of patient cost sharing according to assessments of the value of different types of 
services. Increased research on effectiveness is clearly an underpinning of this policy option.
Reducing obesity and improving wellness
Obesity was also mentioned as an important driver of health care spending. Efforts to slow or 
reverse increasing rates of obesity have the potential to lower health spending trends. It would be 
better to broaden this option to health promotion and wellness in general. For example, obesity 
is likely to contribute less to cost trends if the hypertension and diabetes that are associated with 
it are better controlled. Encouraging overweight people to exercise more would likely reduce 
spending even if it does not succeed in lowering weight. In addition, there are opportunities to 
address other aspects of poor health that lead to higher spending, such as depression.
Improving efﬁ ciency
This synthesis suggested that suboptimal gains in productivity in the delivery of health care are a 
possible cost driver. For example, if the efficiency of delivery of services could be increased by 20 
percent over 10 years, this would roughly close the gap between spending growth and GDP over 
that period. Indeed, the very large gains in productivity in manufacturing come from continuous 
implementation of discrete changes in processes that reduce the level of costs of production. To 
the degree that this happens year after year, it is because of a management process that continually 
applies resources to search for additional opportunities to reduce the level of costs.
Additional aspects of provider payment reform could lead to gains in productivity. To the degree 
that provider incentives are changed from those most common today—which produce individual 
services efficiently but generate more services—to those that focus more on accomplishing what 
patients need, productivity could increase. Payment mechanisms potentially more consistent with 
efficiency include a single per episode payment that goes to all providers involved in a major acute 
procedure and capitation payments to a medical practice for the management of patients’ chronic 
diseases (38). The patient-centered medical home, a concept that has received substantial atten-
tion, can be seen as an initial step toward the use of capitation payment for chronic disease. For 
prescription drugs, some propose increasing efficiency by separating research and development 
from marketing and distribution (32).
Addressing supply side drivers
Provider and facility supply was mentioned as a possible driver. The literature on the impact of 
state certificate-of-need (CON) laws on health care spending has not provided support to the 
notion that these activities succeeded in suppressing spending (71, 6, 18). The best policy oppor-
tunities in this area might include provider payment reform, which would remove the inadvertent 
incentives to become a specialist or invest in profitable equipment, and increasing financial incen-
tives for patients. For example, lower payment rates for imaging might accomplish much more 
in reducing rates of low-value imaging than would attempts to constrain supply. Changes in laws 
applying to physician self-referral might also effectively impact supply.
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Tightening administrative costs
Administrative costs were noted as a key reason why spending in the United States exceeds that 
of other advanced countries. Some of this is embedded in multi-payer versus single-payer systems. 
Although the U.S. commitment to the former is unlikely to change in the near future, a multi-
payer system can be made more efficient. For example, creation of insurance exchanges could 
reduce distribution costs of insurance purchased by individuals or small employers. Opportuni-
ties likely exist, especially in Medicare, to spend more on administration and save money overall 
through lower benefit payments. Although health plans abandoned many administrative controls 
in the wake of the managed care backlash, some are being reintroduced in a more targeted and 
less intrusive manner, such as prior authorizations for imaging and limiting imaging facilities in 
networks to those meeting quality standards (85).
This list of policy options to address the various drivers of rising costs is certainly not exhaus-
tive. Some options where the potential to reduce costs is more uncertain may have a strong basis 
for being pursued nevertheless. Examples include expansion of health information technology, 
which is likely to improve quality of care and might reduce costs at the same time, and medical 
liability reform, which has the potential to more efficiently compensate injured patients and more 
effectively deter poor quality.
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The area covered by this synthesis that is least understood is medical technology. Since the 
medical care system addresses so many different health problems, most new technologies will be 
applicable to a very narrow segment of health care. The need to aggregate so many technologies 
in order to understand trends is daunting. Traditionally, the result has been almost no research on 
societal perspectives on technological change in medicine. Today, this has evolved to research on 
selected technologies, but the process of selecting technologies is so unstructured so as to leave 
real concerns about how representative those technologies are.
Overall our understanding of high and rising costs is fairly solid. Our most pressing needs are not 
as much on the research side as on the development side; that is, all of the technical work needed 
to pursue many of the reforms to the health care system that are seen as long-term approaches to 
address health care costs. For example, value-based benefit designs need extensive development. 
Paying multiple providers for acute episodes of care requires advances in patient classification 
and risk adjustment. Paying for medical homes similarly needs better risk-adjustment models and 
the gathering of data on resources that go into care coordination. To put it differently, existing 
research has given us a satisfactory understanding of the problem. Now the energies of researchers 
should be directed toward developing and implementing solutions.
The Need for Additional Information
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